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Abstract: Schizophrenia is a mental disorder associated with a variety of symptoms, including 
hallucinations, delusions, social withdrawal, and cognitive dysfunction. Impairments on 
decision-making tasks are routinely reported: evidence points to a particular deficit in learning 
from and revising behavior following feedback. In addition, patients tend to make hasty deci-
sions when probabilistic judgments are required. This is known as “jumping to conclusions” 
(JTC) and has typically been demonstrated by presenting participants with colored beads drawn 
from one of two “urns” until they claim to be sure which urn the beads are being drawn from 
(the proportions of colors vary in each urn). Patients tend to make early decisions on this task, 
and there is evidence to suggest that a hasty decision-making style might be linked to delusion 
formation and thus be of clinical relevance. Various accounts have been proposed regarding 
what underlies this behavior. In this review, we briefly introduce the disorder and the decision-
making deficits associated with it. We then explore the evidence for each account of JTC in the 
context of a wider decision-making deficit and then go on to summarize work exploring JTC 
in healthy controls using pharmacological manipulations and functional imaging. Finally, we 
assess whether JTC might have a role in therapy.
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Introduction to Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia (SZ) is a mental disorder that, across the life span, affects approxi-
mately 0.3%–0.7% of the population. Formal diagnosis of the disorder (according to 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition [DSM-V] crite-
ria) requires symptoms to be present over an extended period of time, with so-called 
“positive” symptoms defined as those that represent a change in behavior or thoughts. 
These include delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech and behavior. “Nega-
tive” symptoms are those that represent a withdrawal or lack of function, and these 
include social withdrawal, affective flattening, anhedonia, and cognitive dysfunction. 
Some degree of social or occupational dysfunction must also be present.1 Typically, 
the onset of symptoms is observed in young adulthood.2 Some 80%–90% of patients 
with SZ experience symptomology before being formally diagnosed, reporting changes 
in perception, beliefs, cognition, mood, affect, and behavior.3 This is known as the 
prodromal (preonset) phase of the illness and can last from several weeks to several 
years; this phase is also referred to as an At-Risk Mental State (ARMS).4 During the 
prodrome, individuals typically first experience nonspecific clinical symptoms, such as 
depression, anxiety, or social isolation, followed by episodes of attenuated psychotic 
episodes: these are subpsychotic in that they are of low frequency, duration, and 
intensity.5 In the latter stages of the prodromal period, individuals often report unusual 
thoughts that could be regarded as predelusional as well as perceptual abnormalities 
that could be prehallucinatory. Antipsychotic medication is the first line of treatment. 
Antipsychotics act to block dopamine function and can ameliorate positive symptoms 
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in the majority of patients. Negative symptoms are harder to 
treat,6 although recent evidence points to some improvement 
after antipsychotic therapy.7 Negative symptoms include 
cognitive impairment across multiple domains; this impair-
ment tends to be fairly stable and unresponsive to treatment, 
although behavioral treatment might be more effective than 
antipsychotic therapy.8
Decision-making processes in SZ
Disorganized thoughts and speech patterns are a hallmark of 
SZ and exist alongside impaired motivation and a marked 
difficulty in maintaining and pursuing long-term life goals.9 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that studies have routinely 
reported decision-making abnormalities in SZ patients. For 
example, patients have been shown to have poor accuracy 
on tests such as the well-used Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task, which has participants learn and update card-sorting 
rules.10 Some studies have shown that SZ patients fail to 
acquire even the first sorting rule and that this is not due 
to a general cognitive impairment.11 Patients often show 
high rates of perseverative errors, suggesting a difficulty 
in abandoning and updating a response pattern in the face 
of negative feedback.12 Analyses of patient performance 
on the first few trials of the task (during acquisition of the 
first sorting rule) suggest a specific deficit in sensitivity 
to negative feedback,13 with patients showing a relative 
inability to change their behavior after receiving negative 
feedback. Work using other tasks, including acquisition of 
stimulus–response pairs14 and probabilistic learning,15,16 
support this conclusion. Dopaminergic activity could rep-
resent a teaching signal that serves to modulate behavior 
following feedback.17,18 Dopamine pathways are implicated 
in SZ because atypical antipsychotics act on dopamine D2 
receptors,19 and patients with SZ show increased striatal 
dopamine release under amphetamine challenge compared 
to healthy controls.20–22 Furthermore, recent functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) work has shown that 
patients have reduced striatal responses during implicit 
learning tasks,23,24 as well as attenuated neural responses to 
unexpected reward.25 Thus, poor detection of environmental 
contingencies and a difficulty in reversal learning could be 
due to an unresponsive reward system driven by aberrant 
dopaminergic function in SZ.
Electroencephalogram (EEG) studies provide some 
evidence of this. A component of the event-related poten-
tial, known as the feedback negativity (FBN), is elicited by 
feedback informing participants that their choice has resulted 
in a loss. In SZ, the FBN has been shown to be diminished, 
suggesting that sensitivity to negative feedback is impaired;26 
it is thought that the FBN is generated by the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC).27 There is evidence that the FBN could reflect 
the activity of dopaminergic input to motor-related neurons in 
ACC,28 a structure thought to be critical for error monitoring 
and the self-correction of behavior,29 and it has been suggested 
that impaired reward-based decision making is a consequence 
of a wider deficit in self-monitoring, since patients are less 
likely than controls to correct their hand movements in error 
trials, suggesting a self-monitoring deficit.30,31 Importantly, 
SZ patients show lower error signals in ACC, combined with 
less performance adjustment during fMRI tasks;32 structural 
abnormalities in prefrontal areas are often reported in imaging 
studies of SZ patients.33–36
The ACC and other adjacent medial prefrontal areas 
are thought to be critical for both self-monitoring and the 
attribution of mental states to other agents, an ability known 
as theory of mind. Theory-of-mind tasks reliably activate 
the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC),37 and there is some 
evidence that evaluation of social reward38 and social 
transgression39 also engage this region. Patients have been 
shown to perform poorly on theory-of-mind tasks,40–42 and 
it has been suggested that impairments in self-monitoring 
and theory of mind are core deficits in SZ, giving rise 
to a range of positive and negative symptoms.42 Frith42 
suggests that blunted affect and social withdrawal result 
from difficulties in inferring the mind states of others 
and that experience of thought insertion and alien control 
(routinely reported in SZ) might stem from a failure in 
self-monitoring. A lack of awareness regarding one’s own 
intentions mean that internal experiences are sometimes 
attributed to an external agency. Frith42 also suggests that 
delusional thinking (a common positive symptom of SZ, 
often persecutory in nature) results from faulty inferences 
regarding the motives of other people and there is some 
evidence to support this.43,44
Jumping to conclusions
Another suggestion is that delusional thinking in SZ is closely 
related to impaired decision-making processes. Specifi-
cally, it is suggested that delusion formation is linked to a 
particular pattern of performance on probabilistic decision-
making tasks.45 Rather than, or in addition to, stemming from 
impaired theory of mind (where faulty inferences regarding 
the motives of others could lead to delusion formation), it is 
suggested that delusions might be due to a tendency to make 
inferences based on insufficient evidence.46
Some authors have further suggested that disruptions in 
hierarchical Bayesian inference processes might underlie 
both delusions and hallucinations.47–49 In this framework, 
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disrupted dopamine signaling in patients with SZ leads 
to aberrant prediction errors. Delusions are formed by the 
patient to account for these prediction errors, because the 
prediction errors are inconsistent with reality.
Consistent with an underlying deficit in inference, it has 
been reliably shown that delusional symptomology is related 
to “jumping to conclusions (JTC)” in probabilistic reasoning 
tasks. Furthermore, SZ patients tend to show this pattern of 
behavior regardless of whether delusional symptoms are 
present at the time of testing.50 The paradigmatic task to 
demonstrate this is the so-called “urn” or “beads” task. This 
simple task involves two containers (“urns”) containing a 
large number of different-colored beads in differing ratios. 
The participant is informed of these proportions, although 
the containers are hidden from view. The experimenter then 
presents a series of beads one at a time to the participant. After 
each draw, the participant can either make a guess as to which 
urn is being used or see another bead. Patients with SZ tend 
to make early decisions on this task, often making a decision 
after just one draw.51–53 In contrast, healthy controls tend not to 
make a decision before five or six draws have been completed54 
and it has therefore been suggested that making a decision at 
two items or fewer should be classified as JTC.55
The tendency to accept hypotheses prematurely has been 
proposed to be critical in encouraging delusion formation by 
contributing to erroneous inferences.56 There is considerable 
evidence to support the claim that JTC is linked to the presence 
of delusions. JTC can be detected reliably in individuals suf-
fering from delusions, both within SZ and delusional disorder 
(a rare psychiatric condition characterized by the presence of 
delusions without any other symptoms).50 A JTC response 
style is also present in individuals at risk of delusions, those 
who have recovered from delusions, and more delusion-prone 
individuals in the general population.57,58,76 Intriguingly, JTC 
can be detected in 20% of the general population: these 
20% have higher levels of paranoid delusional thoughts and 
report more perceptual anomalies but do not differ in terms 
of affective (anxiety and depression) symptoms.59 Thus, JTC 
seems to be specifically related to delusional ideation, even 
in nonclinical populations. Importantly, JTC can be detected 
in both deluded and nondeluded SZ patients compared to 
healthy and psychiatric controls.53,60,61 Peters and Garety62 
tested patients when actively deluded and then tested them 
again when in remission. The JTC bias was found to be stable, 
suggesting that it might exist in SZ regardless of whether 
delusional symptoms are present. Furthermore, successful 
antipsychotic treatment is not associated with a reduction in 
JTC.64 Other studies however contrast these findings, show-
ing a reduction in both JTC and delusion severity following 
treatment initiation.63,65 Nevertheless, there is some suggestion 
that JTC might be a trait marker for SZ, and this is supported 
by the work of Van Dael et al66 who found evidence of a JTC 
response pattern in first-degree relatives of patients with SZ. 
There is also evidence of a JTC response style in the pro-
drome, where predelusional states often manifest. Broome 
et al67 tested individuals showing prodromal symptoms of 
psychosis on a modified version of the beads task with differ-
ent levels of task difficulty. When the task was more difficult, 
the prodromal group recorded fewer draws-to-decision than 
the control group. Within both groups, JTC was correlated 
with the severity of abnormal beliefs and intolerance of 
uncertainty. In the prodromal group, it was also associated 
with impaired working memory. In contrast, healthy controls 
with poor working memory tended to be more conservative. 
A subsequent study in individuals presenting with first-episode 
psychosis found a higher level of JTC in this group compared 
to age-matched controls.68 Furthermore, in the patient group, 
both intelligence quotient (IQ) and delusion severity, but not 
working memory, were independently associated with JTC. 
On the basis of this evidence, JTC might constitute a risk 
factor in the development of psychosis.
Thus, JTC is a consistent finding in SZ, and there is strong 
evidence linking JTC to delusional ideation in both clinical 
and nonclinical groups. But why do SZ patients show a JTC 
response style? Various competing accounts have been pro-
posed and we will look at each in turn.
working memory impairment
There is some evidence to suggest that working memory might 
be impaired in patients who show JTC compared to those who 
do not. A small study by Ormrod et al69 found that visual work-
ing memory performance was affected in first-episode psycho-
sis patients who showed a JTC response style. In addition, in 
SZ patients with strong current delusions, working memory 
(but not premorbid IQ) was worse in those who demonstrated 
JTC.70 As noted above, Broome et al67 found that JTC in the 
prodrome was linked to working memory impairments. Nev-
ertheless, the presence of a memory aid during the “urn” task 
does not affect JTC in patient groups.51,53 This would appear 
to undermine any suggestion that JTC stems from a relative 
inability to maintain the task items in memory. Working 
memory impairments might correlate with a tendency to JTC, 
but the relationship is unlikely to be causal.
Liberal acceptance
One explanation for the JTC response style observed in SZ is 
that patients simply make decisions based on less evidence. 
This “liberal acceptance” account53,71 was founded on evidence 
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that SZ patients tend not to converge on one particular 
interpretation of a situation (eg, when asked to judge the 
plausibility of multiple interpretations of a picture). Healthy 
controls ruled out interpretations that patients continued to 
liberally entertain, giving higher ratings to a wide range of 
interpretations. SZ patients are proposed to more readily accept 
a response option, while healthy participants are more cautious 
in doing so. In situations where only two (mutually exclusive) 
options are presented, the JTC response style manifests. To 
explore this, Moritz et al71 increased the number of jars to four 
to provide additional ambiguity: this was found to abolish the 
JTC in patients. Thus, JTC appears to only manifest when 
limited alternatives are presented. Although SZ patients made 
a less systematic information search and were more likely to 
consider less valid information, they did not inspect fewer 
pieces of information compared to healthy controls and thus 
did not demonstrate JTC. Effects were found on confidence 
ratings however, with patients more likely to be overconfident, 
using extreme confidence ratings under inappropriate circum-
stances. This is consistent with work showing that SZ patients 
are less confident of their correct answers and overconfident 
when they make errors, during word recall tasks.72,73
Although there were no overall differences between 
patients and controls, symptomatology in the patient group 
was linked to information search. A correlation was observed 
between symptom severity scores (Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale [PANSS] positive, PANSS delusion) and 
the degree of information search, with higher-scoring partici-
pants tending to gather less pieces of information. PANSS 
score did not predict use of extreme confidence ratings, but 
nevertheless this study would suggest that JTC can be largely 
abolished and can manifest as overconfidence only when 
information is presented in the right manner.
Liberal acceptance in patients could be underpinned 
by impulsiveness or motivational factors. Impulsiveness is 
unlikely to be a factor because patients with SZ show similar 
reaction times as healthy controls51,53 and draw more beads 
when the task is made harder.51,55,74 Motivational factors are 
also unlikely to play a part: the possibility that the patients 
overestimate the “cost” of gathering more information (pos-
sibly due to a greater need for closure) has been discounted 
because patients do not seem to experience a greater cost for 
gathering more information.75
Hypersalience of evidence
An alternative explanation is that JTC manifests not through 
a lowered threshold for making a decision but through each 
piece of evidence being relatively “overvalued”. When asked 
to report belief estimates after each draw, it has been shown 
that patients make more drastic updates after each piece of 
evidence.46,56,77 Speechley et al78 found that delusional patients, 
when asked to give likelihood ratings for each urn on each 
trial, gave higher ratings for whichever urn matched the cur-
rent evidence, while ratings for the nonmatching urn did not 
differ from those of the control groups. Delusional patients 
were also more confident from the outset, showing a higher 
baseline. The authors argue that this provides evidence of a 
reasoning bias characterized by hypersalience of evidence that 
matches a hypothesis, but with reasoning that appears intact for 
nonmatches. The literature is inconsistent regarding patients’ 
responses to nonmatches (“disconfirmatory” evidence). 
Because delusions are maintained in the face of contradictory 
evidence, it is unsurprising that patients tend to show a bias 
against disconfirmatory evidence.79 It has been argued that 
hypersalience could underlie this effect: hypersalience of 
evidence–hypothesis matches may lead to an enhancement 
of weak matches, leading to difficulties in integrating disam-
biguating information.80 Some studies point to hypersalience 
of disconfirmatory, as well as confirmatory, evidence: deluded 
patients show a tendency to overadjust when presented with 
potentially disconfirmatory evidence,53,56 although this effect 
might be linked to miscomprehension of the task,81 especially 
because such a tendency would contradict the evidence of 
reversal-learning deficits discussed in the previous section.
These findings are consistent with an aberrant salience 
account of SZ,82 whereby dysregulated dopamine transmis-
sion generates context-inappropriate salience attributions, 
potentially due to aberrant signaling in the ventral striatal 
dopaminergic pathway, which is thought to regulate stimulus–
response pairings.83 Moore and Sellen84 built a simple network 
model in which the gain, or signal-to-noise, parameter (which 
describes the likelihood of a node firing when presented with 
some input) was varied. The gain parameter was assumed to 
represent striatal dopaminergic activity, and increasing this 
parameter meant that the model successfully mimicked the 
JTC response style seen in research data from delusional 
patients. This might be overly simplistic however, because 
imaging studies have shown that the striatum is downregulated 
in ARMS85 and SZ patients.86 Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that evidence for hypersalience has been observed across 
various other cognitive biases present in SZ87–89 and as such 
represents a convincing account of JTC.
“Self-monitoring” difficulties
As mentioned previously, another suggestion concerning the 
development of delusions in SZ focuses on impairments in 
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theory of mind.42 Langdon et al77 compared 35 SZ patients 
with a history of delusions to healthy controls, on a battery 
of tasks that included two versions of the urn task, three 
theory-of-mind tasks, and a questionnaire on attributional 
biases. A JTC response style was found in the patient group, 
as well as impairments on the theory of mind tasks and 
evidence of an externalizing attributional bias. Performance 
on the urn tasks correlated with that of the theory-of-mind 
tasks, while attributional bias scores did not correlate with 
other task measures. Delusion proneness (measured by the 
questionnaire) correlated with probabilistic reasoning and 
theory-of-mind measures, while externalizing bias did not; 
IQ and memory ability were accounted for. Although it was 
draws-to-decision that correlated most robustly with delusion 
proneness, these data prompted the authors to suggest that a 
common underlying mechanism might operate in SZ to drive 
probabilistic reasoning and theory of mind deficits. They 
speculate that this could be a difficulty in inhibiting sensory 
input reflecting the immediate perceived reality, thus making 
patients more likely to be influenced by current data when 
making decisions on probabilistic reasoning tasks and mak-
ing it harder to maintain an abstract viewpoint as required by 
theory-of-mind tasks. This echoes the hyersalience account 
outlined above. However, it should be noted that a large 
meta-analysis found no evidence for a link between theory 
of mind deficits and positive symptoms; instead, deficits in 
theory of mind were correlated with negative symptoms, 
disorganization, and cognitive impairment.90
There is also some suggestion that poor emotion regu-
lation might have a role to play. In one study, 90 healthy 
individuals with varying levels of psychosis vulnerability 
(assessed by the Community Assessment of Psychic Experi-
ences) were recruited.74 Half the sample received an anxiety 
induction procedure, the other half did not. Paranoid delu-
sions and JTC were then assessed during the session. The 
anxiety induction procedure promoted delusions and JTC, 
and participants with higher psychosis vulnerability showed 
greater increases in paranoid delusional ideation. Further-
more, JTC appeared to mediate the association between 
anxiety and delusions, prompting the authors to suggest that 
paranoid delusions result from an interaction of anxiety and 
reasoning biases. In the Glöckner and Moritz91 study, it was 
found that increasing stress (through time pressure and the 
addition of affective valence) led to diminished performance 
in patients. Thus, improved self-monitoring in terms of better 
emotion regulation, combined with metacognitive training 
targeted at reasoning biases, could be beneficial in reducing 
delusion formation in SZ.
Remarks
On balance, the explanations best supported by evidence 
are those of liberal acceptance and hypersalience. At pres-
ent, it is hard to say which is best supported by the evidence 
available: this is possibly because these two explanations are 
by no means mutually exclusive. Hypersalience and liberal 
acceptance could interact to generate JTC and overconfi-
dence. One difficulty in differentiating these explanations is 
that the urn task offers limited information regarding learning 
and decision-making processes. In one of our studies,92 we 
investigated performance in patients on a sequence-learning 
task (sequences of four button presses were learnt using two 
buttons, feedback after each button press) and the typical urn 
task. Patients were able to learn the correct sequence, but 
learning was slower compared to that in healthy controls. 
Interestingly, learning from positive (but not negative) feed-
back in the sequence task correlated with draws-to-decision 
in the urn task: patients who showed a JTC response style 
were impaired in learning from positive feedback. Further-
more, modeling of the data revealed no evidence that patients 
overweigh recent evidence. Thus, these findings clearly 
favor a liberal acceptance account over hypersalience, but 
further work is needed to distinguish liberal acceptance and 
hypersalience, as well as to explore potential interactions with 
emotion regulation and other self-monitoring activities.
In the next section, we discuss work aimed at elucidating 
the neural basis of JTC. Various studies have attempted to 
induce the JTC bias in healthy controls using pharmacologi-
cal manipulations; others have used fMRI.
Methods of investigation
Pharmacological interventions
A drug model of JTC in healthy controls would be informative 
regarding the neurobiological underpinnings of JTC. There is 
some evidence that the noncompetitive N-methyl-d-aspartate 
(NMDA) receptor antagonist ketamine could serve as such a 
model. Because ketamine can be safely administered under 
clinical supervision and has relatively short-lived effects, 
the drug could represent a useful tool for studying processes 
underlying JTC. Ketamine infusions in healthy controls can 
induce behavioral and cognitive disturbances that are some-
what similar to the symptoms of SZ,93–95 infusions induce 
delusional thinking,96,97 and ketamine use has been linked 
to increased delusional symptoms in recreational users.98 
Importantly, ketamine infusions in patients with SZ cause a 
worsening of symptoms.99–101 Ketamine has been shown to 
affect both glutamatergic and dopaminergic systems,102,103 
potentially mimicking the aberrant dopaminergic transmission 
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posited to underlie the JTC effect seen in SZ; ketamine also 
increases basal ganglia and thalamic activation in a manner 
similar to that observed in SZ patients.104
A recent study by Corlett et al105 administered ketamine to 
healthy controls to investigate whether faulty prediction error 
signals could underlie delusion formation in SZ. Prediction 
error is defined by the mismatch between expectations and 
experience, and it is probably represented by activity in the 
mesostriatal dopamine system.106 The prediction error signal 
in frontostriatal regions has been shown to correlate with 
delusion-like beliefs in healthy people107 and to be predictive 
of the severity of delusions in SZ patients.108 Disrupted predic-
tion error signals could cause individuals to attend to and make 
associations with inappropriate stimuli (both internal and 
external), consequently developing beliefs that do not reflect 
real-world contingencies,108 causing a JTC style of respond-
ing. Corlett et al105 found that ketamine could strengthen the 
memory trace of a previously conditioned stimulus when it 
was presented again, without reinforcement, offering tentative 
support for this hypothesis. However, another study failed 
to find a JTC response style during the urn task in healthy 
controls receiving ketamine. This suggests that although 
ketamine can induce delusions in healthy controls, delusion 
formation under ketamine might not be so closely linked to 
JTC as in SZ,109 although possibly higher doses of ketamine 
might be required for JTC to manifest. Interestingly, work 
investigating the effects of dopamine agonists and antagonists 
in healthy controls has also failed to induce JTC, suggesting 
that straightforward modulation of the dopaminergic system 
might not be sufficient to reproduce the JTC response style 
seen in SZ. A dopamine agonist, l-dopa, had no effect on 
draws-to-decision, or confidence, whereas a dopamine antago-
nist (haloperidol) was found to reduce overconfidence but had 
no effect on draws-to-decision.110 Likewise, dopaminergic 
modulation with methamphetamine does not affect draws-to-
decision.111 In sum, attempts to promote JTC in controls using 
pharmacological interventions have been largely unsuccess-
ful. Thus, it would seem that JTC cannot be attributed solely 
to general dopaminergic overactivity, at least when induced 
acutely: the relationship might not be linear, or perhaps 
chronic aberrations in dopamine firing is required for JTC to 
manifest. Alternatively, the disrupted interactions between 
several neurotransmitter systems might be critical.
fMRi studies
fMRI can potentially indicate the neural mechanisms con-
tributing to probabilistic reasoning in the urn task. Studies 
in healthy controls implicate a distributed network of brain 
areas, including parietal cortex (typically around intraparietal 
sulcus), prefrontal cortex (typically dorsolateral), anterior 
insula, and striatum. These fMRI studies use paradigms, 
including draw events (stimuli for which participants choose 
to gather more information) and urn events (in which par-
ticipants decide they have enough evidence and so select 
an urn). Some of these studies compared “urn task blocks” 
(which collapse over draw and urn decision events) with 
blocks where participants performed a control task on the 
same stimuli. The most consistent finding across these block 
design studies are parietal responses near the intraparietal sul-
cus, which are larger for urn task blocks,112–114 although some 
of these studies also report enhanced responses in the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex113–115 and anterior insula.113,115 
One of these studies included a SZ patient group and showed 
that the enhanced responses for the urn task blocks in the 
parietal and prefrontal cortices was reduced in these indi-
viduals, compared to the responses in healthy controls.113 
This conclusion is tentative, however, as this study failed to 
replicate the classic JTC behavioral effect in SZ.
These block-design studies are limited, as they cannot 
distinguish fMRI responses to draw choice events (decisions 
to gather more information) from fMRI responses associated 
with final choices of an urn. JTC occurs when data gathering 
is discontinued in favor of choosing an urn, so brain areas 
contributing to urn choice events are likely to be involved 
in JTC. Studies that contrast fMRI responses to urn choices 
versus draw choices yield similar results as the block-design 
contrasts. Urn choices, compared to draw choices, activate 
anterior insula, striatum,115,116 ACC, and parietal cortex, 
including the intraparietal sulcus.116 A near-identical network 
of brain areas has also been observed in the analogous con-
trast in the closely related “best choice task”.117 Here, this 
network of areas was associated with deciding on an option 
currently available (eg, a used car), compared to deciding to 
sample more possible options (eg, viewing more cars). Furl 
and Averbeck116 found further roles for this parietal cortex 
area in the urn task. Parietal cortex was more responsive dur-
ing urn decisions for participants who tended to draw more 
and for participants who made greater adjustments to their 
draws-to-decision depending on prevalence of the minority 
bead color. These latter findings link parietal responses to 
individual differences in information-gathering behavior. 
However, this between-participant variability was within a 
nonclinical sample, and it remains to be confirmed whether 
it also extends to clinical cases such as SZ.
Involvement of areas such as striatum, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, and intraparietal sulcus in deciding on a 
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probabilistic inference rather than continued evidence seek-
ing (as in JTC) is perhaps not surprising. These brain areas 
are known to contribute to related decision-making tasks. For 
example, measures of evidence accumulation for perceptual 
decisions have been associated with fMRI responses in the 
prefrontal cortex of psychiatrically healthy participants118 
and in neural recordings from the striatum119 and intraparietal 
sulcus in monkeys.120 Measures of evidence accumulation for 
economic decisions in healthy participants are also associ-
ated with fMRI responses in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
striatum, and intraparietal sulcus.121 Prefrontal cortex lesions 
are also associated with JTC.122
We hypothesize that this network of areas, which con-
tributes to the urn task and other decision-making tasks in 
healthy participants, may be compromised in SZ patients 
who show JTC behavior. The striatum, for instance, signals 
errors in reward prediction and predicts successful reward 
learning in healthy participants123 but shows aberrant 
responses during reward prediction tasks in schizophrenic 
individuals.124,125 Aberrant prediction-related signaling in the 
dopaminergic striatum might also play a role in JTC behavior, 
as dopaminergic antipsychotic treatment abolishes JTC on an 
emotionally salient version of the urn task.64 In addition to 
the striatum, responses in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
are also reduced in schizophrenics, compared to those in 
healthy individuals, when performing tasks requiring reward 
prediction.126 In sum, schizophrenic individuals appear to 
show reward-related response reductions in many of the 
brain areas activated by the urn task in healthy participants. 
Dysfunctional interactions between the dopaminergic 
striatum and cortical areas, such as intraparietal sulcus and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, might explain JTC behavior 
in SZ patients. More brain-imaging studies using SZ patients 
and the urn task are required to test this hypothesis.
Role in therapy
Some studies have suggested that the JTC bias could repre-
sent an important therapeutic target. Using an emotionally 
salient version of the urn task, Menon et al64 found that 
within 2 weeks of initiating treatment with antipsychotics, 
patients demonstrated an increase in the number of trials-to-
decision alongside attenuation of psychotic symptoms and 
delusions. Although these measures were not correlated, 
baseline performance on the task had some predictive power 
over the individuals who would show improvements in 
symptomology in response to medication: JTC performance 
at baseline could therefore be useful in guiding treatment. 
Moreover, treatment-related improvements in JTC can 
predict probability of regaining full employment, measured 
over a 6-month window. This was not the case for positive 
symptoms or neuropsychological performance, suggesting 
that JTC might act independently to influence real-world 
functioning.127 It is important to note that most studies have 
failed to show improvements in JTC on the standard urn task 
following antipsychotic treatment,64,128 although there is some 
evidence to dispute this.63,65 If JTC does indeed fluctuate with 
delusional symptoms, it would provide strong evidence of its 
importance as a treatment target: interventions that specifi-
cally target cognitive biases (known as metacognitive training 
programs) have already been shown to improve delusions 
and other positive symptoms.129,130 It is also important to note 
that most studies typically detect JTC in only approximately 
50% of their patient samples. This heterogeneity needs to 
be explored further, to determine how it might relate to 
heterogeneity of symptomatology or whether it could be an 
issue of task sensitivity. Again, individual differences in JTC 
performance could be useful in determining the best course 
of treatment. Training programs that aim to ameliorate the 
JTC response style might prove to be an important adjunct 
to established therapies.
Conclusion
In sum, JTC in SZ seems to be a consistent finding and there 
is strong evidence linking JTC to delusion formation. Both 
liberal acceptance and hypersalience accounts of JTC are well 
supported by the literature, but attempts to replicate JTC in 
healthy controls using pharmacological manipulations have 
largely failed, undermining attempts to develop a neurobio-
logical account of JTC. fMRI studies have implicated a net-
work involved in making urn choices, which includes striatal, 
insula, parietal, and prefrontal areas; further patient work is 
required, particularly in the context of evidence suggesting 
that JTC could represent a valuable therapeutic target.
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